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Abstract Diagnosis and decisions on life-sustaining
treatment (LST) in disorders of consciousness, such as the
vegetative state (VS) and the minimally conscious state
(MCS), are challenging for neurologists. The locked-in
syndrome (LiS) is sometimes confounded with these dis-
orders by less experienced physicians. We aimed to
investigate (1) the application of diagnostic knowledge, (2)
attitudes concerning limitations of LST, and (3) further
challenging aspects in the care of patients. A vignette-
based online survey with a randomized presentation of a
VS, MCS, or LiS case scenario was conducted among
members of the German Society for Neurology. A sample
of 503 neurologists participated (response rate 16.4%). An
accurate diagnosis was given by 86% of the participants.
The LiS case was diagnosed more accurately (94%) than
the VS case (79%) and the MCS case (87%, p \ 0.001).
Limiting LST for the patient was considered by 92, 91, and
84% of the participants who accurately diagnosed the VS,
LiS, and MCS case (p = 0.09). Overall, most participants
agreed with limiting cardiopulmonary resuscitation; a
minority considered limiting artificial nutrition and
hydration. Neurologists regarded the estimation of the
prognosis and determination of the patients’ wishes as most
challenging. The majority of German neurologists accu-
rately applied the diagnostic categories VS, MCS, and LiS
to case vignettes. Their attitudes were mostly in favor of
limiting life-sustaining treatment and slightly differed for
MCS as compared to VS and LiS. Attitudes toward LST
strongly differed according to circumstances (e.g., patient’s
will opposed treatment) and treatment measures.
Keywords End-of-life decisions 
Limitation of life-sustaining treatment  Diagnosis 
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Introduction
The vegetative state (VS) and the minimally conscious
state (MCS) are conditions that result from severe trau-
matic or non-traumatic brain injury, referred to as disorders
of consciousness (DOC). In the VS, patients are awake, but
do not show any signs of awareness, as judged by
responsiveness [1, 2]. Recently, the European Task Force
on DOC proposed the term ‘‘unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome’’ (UWS) as a superior alternative to VS [3]. In
the MCS, patients display limited, but reproducible
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evidence of awareness without having the ability to com-
municate reliably [4]. Several studies have revealed mis-
diagnosis rates of 40%, in cases in which clinical bedside
examination was compared to expert assessment or neu-
robehavioral testing [5–7]. Misdiagnosed patients were
presumed to be in VS, but after a reassessment they were
categorized as being in either a MCS or locked-in syn-
drome (LiS), where the patient is fully aware, has quadri-
plegia and aphonia or severe hypophonia, but is usually
capable of communication by eye movements or blinking
[8, 9]. Inaccurate diagnosis is both a medical and an ethical
problem. It biases prognostication and therapeutic strategy,
and may lead to flawed decisions to withdraw or withhold
life-sustaining treatment (LST) [2, 10].
The ethical justification of administering LST in these
patients is a matter of intense ethical and societal debate,
specifically with regard to the use of artificial nutrition and
hydration, as in the public cases of Terri Schiavo and Eluana
Englaro [11, 12]. Most surveys that investigated physicians’
attitudes toward LST in DOC patients were conducted before
the MCS was defined as a separate diagnostic category in
2002 [13–16]. A recently published European survey found
that the diagnosis of VS or MCS influences ethical attitudes
toward LST [17]. This survey, however, targeted a hetero-
geneous convenience sample of attendees at scientific con-
ferences and asked for attitudes toward LST for patients in
chronic VS or MCS ([1 year). To our knowledge, no survey
has investigated physicians’ attitudes toward LST for
patients in the LiS. A Japanese study used case vignettes to
study physicians’ attitudes toward LST in VS patients, but
the patient’s diagnosis was always provided. To our
knowledge, no survey has used case vignettes instead of
diagnostic terms to examine the participants’ attitudes
toward LST. By means of a web-based survey, we wanted to
examine the attitudes of German neurologists regarding
ethical issues in DOC and the LiS, and to assess the appli-
cation of their diagnostic knowledge to a case vignette. We
aimed to answer the following research questions: (1) how
accurately do neurologists apply the diagnostic categories
VS, MCS or LiS to hypothetical cases? (2) Do neurologists’
attitudes toward LST for these patients differ according to
the diagnosis of the patient? (3) Which ethically relevant
aspects do neurologists evaluate as being the most chal-
lenging in the care of DOC and LiS patients?
Methods
Questionnaire
We developed a 37-item questionnaire in English. Three case
vignettes (see Table 1), at the beginning of the questionnaire,
were drafted by a neurologist (R.J.J) based on clinical
consensus guidelines, and revised and verified by an inter-
national scientific advisory board of neurological DOC
experts. The cases were presented randomly; each participant
activating the link to the survey website received only one
case and had an equal chance of getting one of the three cases.
After the presentation of the case, participants were
asked: ‘‘if you had to assess the described case without
detailed behavioral testing or technical diagnostic investi-
gations, which diagnosis do you think fits best to the case?’’
Participants could choose among five diagnostic categories
(VS, MCS, LiS, brain death, and coma) or give an alter-
native diagnosis in an open text field. No definitions of the
VS, MCS, or LiS were provided. Participants were asked
how certain they were on a numeric rating scale (NRS)
(0–10, 10 = extremely certain) about the diagnostic cate-
gory that they assigned to the case. They were also asked to
estimate the patient’s functional outcome (‘‘What do you
think will be the patient’s functional outcome in 6 months
as measured by the modified Rankin scale?’’). To assess the
neurologists’ conceptual understanding underlying the
diagnosis, they were asked to judge which cognitive,
emotional and behavioral capabilities such a patient has,
choosing from a given list. Furthermore, the participants
should estimate the quality of life of such a patient on a
NRS, including the options of ‘‘no quality of life’’ and ‘‘I
don’t feel able to rate the patient’s quality of life.’’ Phy-
sicians’ attitudes toward limiting LST were elicited by the
following request: ‘‘Please specify: In the prior case life-
sustaining treatment should be limited (a) never,
(b) always, or (c) under certain circumstances.’’ If partic-
ipants chose ‘‘always’’ or ‘‘under certain circumstances,’’
they had to specify these on given lists of ten different
circumstances. If the circumstances did not apply to the
case (like recovery of consciousness to the LiS) partici-
pants could choose alternatively ‘‘does not apply.’’ In
addition, participants were asked which specific treatment
measures they would consider limiting. Finally, they were
asked to rate the extent to which they find 13 ethically
relevant aspects of caring for DOC patients challenging on
a NRS. We asked for participants’ characteristics such as
gender, age, work environment, professional experience,
and religion. Religion was analyzed according to religious
practice and spiritual beliefs.
The questionnaire was pre-tested by five experts (four
neurologists and a medical ethicist) and modified accord-
ingly. We translated the final questionnaire into German
using backward-forward translation [18]. Two German
native speakers, who were involved in constructing the
English survey (K.K., R.J.J.), translated the questionnaire
independently from one another into German and a native
English speaker translated the survey back into English.
Inconsistencies were identified and led to a refinement of
both the original English and the translated German
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version. Online formatting was done with Survey Monkey
software (Survey Monkey, Portland, OR, USA). The Ger-
man questionnaire can be accessed by the link https://www.
surveymonkey.com/s/UmfrageuberBewusstseinsstorungen
(accessed 31 January 2012) without the need to type in a
code.
Data collection
The study was approved by the research ethics committee
of the local medical faculty. To include a representative
cohort of German neurologists, we contacted the German
Society for Neurology (Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Neurol-
ogie), which facilitated the distribution of the survey link.
Members of the society are physicians with a license to
practice medicine and a small number (*0.1%) are med-
ical students. Out of 6,673 members, we contacted all
3,073 members from whom the society had e-mail
addresses and invited only physicians to participate. In the
initial contact e-mail, we explained the purpose, objectives,
and content of the study (medical and ethical aspects,
diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment decisions for patients
with disorders of consciousness), the voluntariness and
data protection rules, the time it might take to fill out the
questionnaire (10–20 min), a deadline for the participation,
and provided the link to the survey website. Members with
invalid addresses were excluded. The study was powered to
detect a 15% difference in the attitudes toward limiting
LST among the three cases, with a probability of 80%. The
data were gathered within a 4-week period from July to
August 2011. To encourage participation we offered an
opportunity to participate in a lottery, consisting of six
prizes with a total value of €1,500. After 3 weeks, we sent
a reminder and prolonged the participation period for an
additional week. Data were gathered anonymously, and
participants gave their informed consent.
Statistical analysis
Participants who made errors diagnosing the patients in the
case vignettes were excluded from the analysis of their
attitudes and their evaluation of challenges, because it was
unclear whether they answered the remaining questions
according to the vignette description or according to their
inaccurate choice of diagnosis.
Data were downloaded from Survey Monkey and
imported into IBM SPSS 19 statistics software. Pearson’s
v2 test was performed to assess differences between cate-
gories. For numerical or ordinal data, the Mann-Whitney
U test was applied to compare two groups, and the Kruskal-
Wallis H test was performed to compare three (or more)
groups. Binary logistic regression analyses were used to
examine associations between predictor variables and the
accuracy of diagnosis, or the attitude toward limiting LST.
Results were considered significant if p \ 0.05, and a trend
to significance was reported if p \ 0.10. Following the
recommendations of Perneger, p values are descriptive and
were not adjusted for multiple comparisons [19].
Results
Cohort and sample
Of the 3,073 members that were contacted, 517 partici-
pated in the online survey. Some society members
Table 1 Case vignettes presented randomly to participants
Case 1a
A 33-year-old man had a cardiac arrest with delayed resuscitation 4 months ago. Currently, he shows brainstem and spinal reflex movements,
but no sign of purposeful movement. His eyes are open for several hours a day, but do not fixate objects or follow them when they move. He
does not react consistently to verbal commands or questions. Sometimes a delayed stiffening of the legs and grimacing can be observed in
reaction to sounds. He can breathe on his own
Case 2b
A 35-year-old woman suffered a severe asthma attack with respiratory failure 4 months ago, causing severe brain injury. Currently, she shows
brainstem and spinal reflexes and a severe spasticity, but no signs of purposeful movement. She does not need any breathing assistance. Her
eyes are open for several hours a day, fixate objects and follow the nurses when they move around her. She does not react consistently to
verbal commands or questions. When she is visited by her mother, she always seems more alert, and when her mother talks to her, she often
smiles and utters single words. This does not happen when other persons talk to her
Case 3c
A 36-year-old man had a brain stem hemorrhage 4 months ago. In the meantime he could be weaned from the ventilator. He does not move
his limbs in any way and suffers from severe spasticity. During the day, his eyes are open for several hours. He consistently follows the
command to blink once or twice, or to move his eyes up and down. A verbal utterance or groaning has not been observed
a Correct diagnosis: vegetative state (VS)
b Correct diagnosis: minimally conscious state (MCS)
c Correct diagnosis: locked-in state (LiS)
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mentioned their reasons for not participating: They either
did not provide care for patients at all (due to retirement, to
other professions, or being heads of the units or institutes),
or they did not take care of patients with DOC. The 517
participants were randomly assigned to the VS (n = 175),
MCS (n = 176), and LiS (n = 166) case. Fourteen par-
ticipants did not complete the questionnaire: 7 were
assigned to the VS case, 5 to the MCS case, and 2 to the
LiS case. A sample of 503 neurologists completed the
online survey (response rate: 16.4%); 168 participants
(33%) filled out the questionnaire with the VS case, 171
(34%) the MCS-based version, and 164 (33%) the LiS-
based questionnaire. The cohort of 3,073 members with
valid e-mail addresses was representative for all members
(6,673) according to age (members: mean 44, standard
deviation (SD) 10, range 25–94, and cohort: mean 45, SD
9, range 25–87) and region of practice, but not gender. A
lower percentage of women (28%) was invited to partici-
pate than the actual percentage of women in the society
(38%). We analyzed whether gender had a significant
influence on physicians’ diagnostic accuracy or their atti-
tudes toward limiting LST and describe these results in the
respective sections. The demographic and professional
characteristics of the participants are presented in Table 2.
The sample was representative for the society according to
age (mean 44, SD 9, range 27–81).
Application of diagnostic knowledge
Overall, 86% (n = 434) of the participants chose the correct
diagnostic category. Of those participants who evaluated the
VS case, 79% gave the diagnosis VS, 18% chose the diag-
nosis MCS, one participant chose coma (1%), and 2% chose
LiS. Of the participants who received the MCS case, 87%
gave the diagnosis MCS, 4% chose VS, 7% chose LiS, and
2% chose the option to suggest an alternative diagnosis (e.g.,
severe anoxic brain injury). Participants with the LiS case
chose the diagnosis LiS (94%), MCS (4%), VS (2%), and one
participant chose the option ‘‘other.’’ The rate of accuracy
differed significantly (p \ 0.001) according to the three case
vignettes (see Fig. 1).
In total, 83% of the female participants compared to
88% of the male participants accurately diagnosed the
cases (p = 0.14). Participants who erred were slightly less
certain about their diagnostic accuracy than participants
who gave the correct answer (median 8 vs. 9 on a NRS,
p \ 0.001).
Table 2 Demographic and professional characteristics of partici-
pants (n = 503)
Age (years), median; 1st 3rd quartile (range) 43; 38, 49 (27–81)
Experience (years) 17; 11, 21 (\1–49)
Gender, n (%) (n = 31 missing)
Female 140 (30)
Male 332 (70)
Primary discipline, n (%) (n = 16 missing)
Neurology 479 (98)
Others (e.g., anesthesiology, psychiatry) 8 (2)
Health care setting, n (%)a
In-patient care 370 (74)
Out-patient care 173 (34)
Kind of care, n (%)a
Acute care 216 (43)
Rehabilitation care 107 (21)
Long-term care 39 (8)
Professional experience with VS patients, n (%)
(n = 25 missing)
0 cases 15 (3)
B20 cases 261 (55)
[20 cases 202 (42)
Professional experience with MCS patients, n (%)
(n = 40 missing)
0 cases 39 (8)
B20 cases 249 (54)
[20 cases 175 (38)
Professional experience with LiS patients, n (%)
(n = 32 missing)
0 cases 54 (11)
B20 cases 356 (76)
[20 cases 61 (13)
Religious practice, n (%) (n = 25 missing)
Practicing religion 250 (52)
Not practicing religion 228 (48)
Spiritual beliefs, n (%) (n = 29 missing)
Spiritual beliefs 317 (67)
No spiritual beliefs 157 (33)
a Multiple answers permitted
Fig. 1 Diagnostic accuracy as studied by three case vignettes on the
vegetative state (VS), minimally conscious state (MCS), and locked-
in syndrome (LiS). The v2 test over all cases was significant
(p \ 0.001). N = 503, VS case (N = 168), MCS case (N = 171), LiS
case (N = 164); numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding
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Professional experience in years, with patients with DOC
or in rehabilitation care
Neurologists with more years of professional experience
had a slightly lower chance of misdiagnosing the MCS case
(OR for 1 year more: 0.9; CI 0.9–1.0; p \ 0.05), but pro-
fessional experience had no significant influence on the
accuracy of the neurologists’ application of the diagnostic
categories to the VS or LiS vignettes (p = 0.23, p = 0.69).
Of the participants who received the VS case and gave
information on their experience with VS (n = 159, missing
data: n = 9), 76% of the neurologists who cared for less
than 20 VS patients, (n = 96; 60%) diagnosed the VS case
accurately, not significantly different from the 84% of
those who cared of more than 20 patients (n = 63, 40%;
p = 0.22). However, in the group of participants who
received the MCS case (n = 164, missing data: n = 7), 93%
of those who were more experienced in the care of VS patients
(n = 74, 45%) chose the correct diagnosis compared to 82%
(n = 90, 55%) of those who were less experienced
(p = 0.04). In the VS case, 79% of the participants who were
more experienced in the care of MCS patients (n = 56, 36%)
chose the accurate diagnosis, being equal to the group of
participants who were less experienced in the care of MCS
patients (n = 99, 64%; p = 0.975). Yet, being highly expe-
rienced in the care of MCS patients was helpful in choosing
the right diagnostic category for the MCS patient (n = 159,
missing data: 12). Out of those who had cared for more than
20 patients (n = 64, 40%) 95% diagnosed the case accurately
compared to 84% of those who cared for less than 20 patients
(p = 0.03). The accuracy rates of those working in a reha-
bilitation setting (n = 107) for the patients in VS (72%),
MCS (89%), or LiS (91%) did not significantly differ from the
accuracy rate of those who did not work in a rehabilitation
setting (80%, 86%, 95%; p = 0.30; p = 0.64; p = 0.49).
We continued our data analysis with participants who
accurately applied the diagnostic knowledge to the cases
(from now on referred to as the VS group: n = 132, MCS
group: n = 148, and LiS group: n = 154).
Patients’ capabilities
The percentage of neurologists agreeing with the presence
of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral capabilities in the
described patients are displayed in Table 3. Neurologists
had different beliefs about which capabilities patients with
VS, MCS, and LiS have. Disagreement was highest in the
MCS case. Neurologists generally agreed that patients like
the LiS patient were aware of themselves and their sur-
roundings, and that the VS patients were not. Half of the
neurologists agreed that MCS patients were aware; half of
them did not. Within the respective cases, however, we
found inconsistent answers. Most neurologists thought that
VS patients are not aware, yet a large proportion of them
simultaneously stated that VS patients feel pain and
experience hunger and thirst. Only 61% of neurologists
thought that LiS patients could feel touch.
Table 3 Frequency of agreement with capabilities of a patient in the
respective condition as judged by neurologists
Frequency (%) VS group
(n = 132)a
MCS
group
(n = 148)a
LiS group
(n = 154)a
Being aware of themselves 9 54 94
Being aware of surroundings 6 57 94
Feeling pain 77 96 86
Smelling odors 35 78 85
Tasting flavor of food/drinks 29 77 63
Feeling touch 67 94 61
Having emotions 35 87 93
Recognizing their name 12 67 92
Recognizing people 13 85 95
Experiencing hunger/thirst 46 92 83
Having sexual desires 13 47 68
Understanding what
others say
8 39 93
Having thoughts 23 72 97
Experiencing dreams 36 76 90
Remembering experiences 13 54 92
Storing new information 8 32 85
Expressing desires 2 20 70
Interacting with others 8 57 86
VS vegetative state, MCS minimally conscious state, LiS locked-in
syndrome
a Those who correctly diagnosed the patients in the respective cases
Fig. 2 Attitudes of those participants who accurately diagnosed the
respective cases toward the limitation of life-sustaining treatment: ‘‘In
the prior case life-sustaining treatment should be limited…?’’ Overall
there was a trend toward significant differences (p = 0.09). Differ-
ences between the attitudes for VS and MCS are statistically
significant (p = 0.04, v2 test). N = 434, VS group (N =132), MCS
group (N = 148), LiS group (N = 154); missing data: VS group
n = 1; MCS group n = 1, LiS group n = 5
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Attitudes toward limitation of life-sustaining treatment
The frequencies of whether LST should be limited for the
patient in the case vignette are presented in Fig. 2. The
attitudes did not differ among the three cases of VS, MCS,
and LiS, but there was a statistical trend (p = 0.09). While
there were no significant differences between the VS and
the LiS group (p = 0.82) or the MCS and the LiS group
(p = 0.11), fewer participants would limit LST in the MCS
case compared to the VS case (p = 0.04).
Circumstances in support of limiting LST
Table 4 shows how many participants agreed with lim-
iting LST under certain circumstances, with the agree-
ment scaled on a five-point rating scale. The particular
Table 4 Distribution and level of agreement (in %) with limiting life-sustaining treatment under certain circumstances depending on the case
groups
Agreement (%) Rating
1 = extremely weak, 5 = extremely strong
Circumstances Groupsa Median n 1 2 3 4 5 p
Patient’s will is opposed to LST VS 5 116 1 1 3 11 85 0.04
MCS 5 121 1 3 4 22 70
LiS 5 134 2 1 3 19 75
Patient suffers additional fatal disease (e.g., cancer) VS 5 116 3 4 5 20 68 0.05
MCS 5 118 0 6 8 29 57
LiS 5 128 4 7 12 23 55
Surrogate decision maker refuses consent to LST VS 4 117 1 11 22 31 35 0.001
MCS 4 119 9 12 20 36 24
LiS 4 132 10 13 27 38 13
No improvement after 1 year or longer VS 4 107 10 11 25 23 30 \0.001
MCS 3 115 20 18 22 25 15
LiS 2 123 26 29 24 15 7
No chance for recovery of consciousnessb VS 4 111 5 14 15 23 43 0.06
MCS 4 115 8 15 16 26 36
LiS 4 123 19 8 16 29 28
No chance for recovery of communication2 VS 3 108 7 19 27 27 20 0.01
MCS 3 116 13 23 30 20 15
LiS 3 107 22 16 32 18 12
Patient obviously suffers intensely VS 3 109 8 15 31 28 17 0.19
MCS 3 117 11 20 26 31 13
LiS 2 127 13 22 25 28 12
If elderly (e.g., 70 years or older) VS 3 102 18 28 30 17 7 0.003
MCS 3 115 16 24 26 23 12
LiS 2 116 29 28 25 12 6
No chance for recovery without disability VS 2 103 44 27 15 9 6 0.55
MCS 2 111 47 25 23 3 2
LiS 1 121 51 24 11 11 3
Resources are scarce and costs high VS 2 100 46 30 17 5 2 0.03
MCS 1 113 55 21 14 6 4
LiS 1 116 65 21 10 3 2
LST Life-sustaining-treatment
From left to right: circumstances under which a those who correctly diagnosed the patients in the respective cases (VS group: n = 132, MCS
group: n = 148, and LiS group: n = 154) agree with limiting LST; N numbers of participants who rated the agreement with LST under specific
circumstances, frequency of participants (in %) who chose the respective number
b If circumstances do not apply to the case (here to LiS), participants could choose ‘‘does not apply.’’ Kruskal-Wallis test; numbers may not add
to 100 due to rounding
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circumstances led to differing attitudes toward limiting
LST. Note that the participants who said they would
never limit LST according to the case in the prior
question skipped this question and the option ‘‘does not
apply’’ was provided for the circumstances that did not
apply to the patient in the respective case (such as no
chance of recovery of consciousness to the LiS case).
Overall, fewer female participants who correctly diag-
nosed the cases (n = 115) gave the answer to never (9%) or
always limit (4%) LST than did male participants (n = 292;
12%, 12%; p \ 0.05). There were significant gender dif-
ferences in the willingness to limit LST under certain cir-
cumstances (see Table 5). More men than women agreed
extremely strongly to limit LST if the patient suffers from an
additional fatal disease or if there is no chance to recover
communication. Yet more women agreed to limit LST if
resources were scarce and costs were high.
Treatment measures
Figure 3 shows the frequency of agreement with the limi-
tation of particular treatment measures. For most measures,
the readiness to limit treatment was highest in the VS
group, lower in the MCS group, and lowest in the LiS
group. Significant differences between the three groups
concerned artificial respiration (p = 0.02), surgery
(p = 0.02), and administration of antibiotics (p \ 0.05).
Participants who correctly diagnosed the cases were also
asked whether they would make the same decisions for
themselves if they were in the situation of the patient in the
case vignette (n = 417). The majority (71%) would want
the same decisions to be made for them, 29% would favor
less intensive LST measures, and only 1% would choose
more intensive LST for them than they considered for the
patient in the case vignette.
Table 5 Distribution and level of agreement (in %) with limiting life-sustaining treatment under certain circumstances depending on the
participant’s gender
Agreement to limit LST: 1 = extremely weak, 5 = extremely strong
Circumstances Gendera Median N 1 (%) 2 (%) 3 (%) 4 (%) 5 (%) p
Patient’s will is opposed to LST Male 5 251 2 1 2 16 79 0.08
Female 5 104 1 2 6 21 70
Patient suffers from additional fatal disease Male 5 252 2 4 8 24 62 0.03
Female 5 100 3 10 10 26 51
Surrogate decision maker refuses consent to LST Male 4 249 6 13 23 35 24 0.76
Female 4 98 8 9 27 34 22
No improvement after 1 year or longer Male 3 237 19 20 22 21 19 0.46
Female 3 93 20 18 27 22 13
No chance for recovery of consciousnessb Male 4 221 9 12 16 24 39 0.19
Female 4 92 13 13 14 30 30
No chance for recovery of communicationb Male 3 225 12 15 30 26 17 \0.001
Female 3 93 22 28 29 10 12
Patient obviously suffers intensely Male 3 249 12 19 28 29 12 0.33
Female 3 98 10 19 24 30 17
If elderly (e.g., 70 years or older) Male 3 231 23 25 28 17 8 0.62
Female 3 89 18 30 25 19 8
No chance for recovery without disability Male 2 234 45 26 16 9 5 0.21
Female 1,5 88 50 26 18 5 1
Resources are scarce and costs high Male 1 228 60 21 14 4 2 0.002
Female 2 88 40 33 15 8 5
LST life-sustaining treatment
From left to right: circumstances under which a those who correctly diagnosed the patients in the respective cases and are male (N = 292) or
female (N = 116) agreed with limiting LST; N numbers of participants who rated their agreement with LST under specific circumstances. Values
in the table represent the distribution of participant’s responses on the rating scale
b If circumstances do not apply to the case (here to LiS), participants could choose ‘‘does not apply.’’ Mann-Whitney U test; numbers may not
add to 100 due to rounding
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Significantly fewer female neurologists were willing to
limit the use of antibiotics (30%), artificial nutrition (22%),
and artificial hydration (10%) than were male neurologists
(40%; 33%; 25%; p = 0.047, p = 0.032, p = 0.01). There
were no significant gender differences in regard to the other
therapeutic measures (cardiopulmonary resuscitation: 86
vs. 88%, p = 0.60; intubation and ventilation: 81 vs. 78%,
p = 0.53; hemodialysis: 71 vs. 96%, p = 0.70; surgery: 57
vs. 52%, p = 0.38).
Quality of life, prognosis, religion, and attitudes toward
LST
The option ‘‘I don’t feel able to rate the patient’s quality of
life’’ was chosen by 32% of the participants (n = 172), the
lowest amount being in the VS group (28%), followed by
the LiS (38%), and MCS (39%) group. The option that the
patient had no quality of life was chosen by 14% in the VS
group, 1% in the MCS group, and 3% in the LiS group. The
median quality of life of the VS patient (1; span 0–4) and
LiS patient (1; span 0–9) was rated lower than that of the
MCS patient (2; span 0–7), and the three groups differed
significantly (p \ 0.001).
Only 3% of those who accurately diagnosed the VS case
and 10% of those who diagnosed the LiS expected a better
outcome (modified Rankin scale 4-0) compared to 25% of
those who correctly diagnosed the MCS case (p \ 0.001).
The others expected severe disability (modified Rankin
scale 5).
Of those who practiced a religion and diagnosed the
patient correctly (n=213), 6% would always limit LST in
the respective case, 13% never, and 81% would limit
treatment under circumstances, significantly different
from those who did not practice a religion (n = 200),
where 13% would always limit LST, 9% never, and 78%
under certain circumstances (p = 0.03). Of those who
had spiritual beliefs in the existence of god, and diag-
nosed the patient correctly (n = 274), 6% would always
limit LST, 11% never, and 83% under circumstances. Of
those who did not have spiritual beliefs, and diagnosed
the case correctly (n = 136), 16% would always limit
LST, 10% never, and 74% under certain circumstances
(p = 0.01).
Appraisal of ethical challenges
Table 6 displays how the participants judged different
ethical challenges in the care of DOC patients. Prognosti-
cating recovery and determining the patient’s wishes were
seen as extremely challenging for all three conditions. The
least challenging issues were reaching an agreement as a
team and multidisciplinary discussions. Overall, there were
only slight differences among the three conditions. Some of
the aspects seem to be a bit more challenging in one con-
dition than another one, such as applying a surrogate’s
decision in VS compared to LiS cases.
Discussion
In this study, we used case vignettes instead of commonly
used diagnostic terms [13–15, 20, 21] to investigate neu-
rologists’ attitudes toward ethical issues that arise in the
care of DOC and LiS patients. The overall accuracy in the
application of diagnostic knowledge of DOC patients was
found to be high in our vignette-based survey (79–86.5%).
Hemodialysis/hemofiltration
Cardiopulmonary rescutilation
Artificial hydration
Artificial nutrition
Antibiotic treatment
Surgical treatment
Intubation/ventilation
0
LiS group MCS group VS group
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Fig. 3 Forms of life-sustaining
treatment that neurologists who
gave the accurate diagnosis
would consider limiting (under
certain circumstances or
always). The bars indicate the
percentage of respondents in
each diagnostic group: VS
(black), MCS (grey), and LiS
(white). n = 434, VS group
(n = 132), MCS group
(n = 148), LiS group
(n = 154); asterisks significant
differences among the three
groups of respondents to the
cases, using Pearson’s v2 test
(p \ 0.05; intubation/
ventilation: p = 0.02, surgical
treatment: p = 0.02, antibiotic
treatment: p \ 0.05)
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Our approach can only be cautiously compared to studies
verifying patients’ diagnoses by clinical assessment or
structured neurobehavioral examination. To compare the
accuracy rates, we should not refer to misdiagnosis of case
vignettes, but to misdiagnosis of diagnostic categories: how
many of those who diagnosed VS actually had the VS
case? If we recalculate the data accordingly, misdiagnosis
in our study was between 7% (VS) and 20% (MCS), which
is lower than in the clinical studies (37–43% of the patients
diagnosed as VS are actually in a MCS or other condition)
[5, 6, 22]. This may be explained by the differing meth-
odological approach of our study. We targeted neurologists
instead of following up on patients and comparing diag-
nosis made on the basis of clinical assessment with diag-
nosis on the basis structural neurobehavioral tests.
Furthermore, we assessed the application of diagnostic
knowledge by presenting a typical, briefly described case
and offering a limited range of potential diagnoses to
choose from. In our study, the VS case led to the highest
error rate, and the error that most often occurred was
overestimating the patient as being in a MCS, suggesting
the need for greater training in distinguishing patients on
the borderline of VS and MCS. The error of overestimating
patients in the VS as being in the MCS was not described
by Schnakers et al. [22]. One could argue that overesti-
mating the patient’s capabilities is an error that is more
preferable than underestimating them when considering the
best interest of the patient. However, the consequences
could be positive and negative: more rehabilitation treat-
ment could be provided to the patient and a longer time-
frame could be awaited to declare the condition as chronic.
If the patient had anticipated a decision for the VS his
autonomy would not be respected because of the misdi-
agnosis. Furthermore, the patients’ family could develop
unrealistic expectations for recovery, communication, or
other outcomes, and it would cause expenses for ineffective
treatment. We were unable to determine factors that reduce
the probability for misdiagnosis for the VS case, but for the
MCS case experience with patients and years of profes-
sional experience were of value, which suggests including
exposure to these sorts of patients during training. That
experience did not predict a more accurate application of
diagnostic knowledge for the VS case, but for the MCS
case, is surprising, and perhaps the VS case stating that the
patient ‘‘inconsistently’’ follows commands was mislead-
ing. Although neurologists who gave the correct diagnosis
were significantly more confident and certain about their
diagnosis than those who erred, even the latter had a rel-
atively high level of confidence in their diagnostic skills.
This may be problematic because they will probably not
seek further training or a second opinion.
The assessment of the patients’ remaining capabilities
(Table 3) provided insight into the neurologists’ under-
standing of VS, MCS, and LiS. This transcends the task of
applying a diagnostic category to a case vignette and tou-
ches on beliefs of what it is like to be in such a state [23].
According to the traditional medical concept, VS patients
are not aware, MCS patients have a rudimentary, partial, or
inconstant awareness, and LiS patients are fully aware of
themselves and their surroundings [24]. The responses
reflect this distinction, with only a small percentage of
neurologists who believe that VS patients are aware and a
Table 6 Appraisal of ethical challenges in the decision-making process for patients like the patient in the presented case
Median (1st, 3rd quartile) on NRS (0–10) Missing data (n)b VS groupa MCS groupa LiS groupa p
Making prognosis and predicting recovery 17 8 (7, 10) 9 (8, 10) 8 (6.25, 10) 0.12
Determining patient’s wishes 17 8 (7, 10) 8 (7, 10) 9 (8, 10) 0.03
Deciding for patient in absence of surrogate 18 8 (7, 10) 8 (6, 10) 8 (7, 10) 0.29
Discontinuing LST 19 8 (5, 10) 8 (5, 10) 7 (6, 10) 0.16
Making correct diagnosis 15 7 (4, 9) 7 (3.5, 8) 7 (3, 9) 0.58
Accompanying family members in decisions 17 7 (6, 9) 7 (5, 8) 8 (6, 9) 0.01
Applying a decision made by surrogate 20 7 (5, 8) 5 (4, 8) 7 (3, 9) 0.001
Evaluating resource allocation 26 7 (4, 9) 7 (5, 9) 6 (3, 9) 0.049
Assessing medical futility 21 7 (5, 8) 7 (5, 8) 7 (6, 8) 0.75
Finding long-term care 21 6 (4, 8) 6 (3, 8) 6 (3, 8) 0.46
Accompanying clients through staff rotations 21 6 (3.5, 8) 6 (5, 7) 6 (5, 9) 0.28
Multidisciplinary discussions for decisions 17 5 (3, 7) 5 (2, 8) 5 (3, 8) 0.39
Reaching an agreement as a team 17 5 (3, 7) 5 (3, 8) 6 (4, 8) 0.06
a Those who correctly diagnosed the patients in the respective cases; n = 434, VS group (n = 132), MCS group (n = 148), LiS group
(n = 154); Kruskal-Wallis test
b Missing data: sum of all cases
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small percentage that even negates awareness in the LiS.
The neurologists in the MCS group are divided: half of
them regard the described MCS patient as being aware and
the other half does not. This may reflect the breadth of and
the uncertainty about the clinical continuum that covers the
category of MCS, which has recently been subdivided into
MCS plus (with high-level behavioral responses like
command following) and MCS minus (with low-level
behavioral responses like visual pursuit) [25]. The results
suggest that the evaluation of the patient’s remaining
capabilities is highly dependent on the neurologists’ con-
ceptual understanding of the syndrome. Interestingly,
although awareness is usually regarded as a prerequisite to
all other mental phenomena, many participants agreed that
VS patients were unaware, but still thought that they were
able to dream, have thoughts and emotions, and perceive
gustatory and tactile stimuli, including pain. Studies using
somatosensory-evoked potentials and positron emission
tomography have shown that noxious stimuli activate the
pain matrix in MCS patients just like in controls, but in VS
patients it is activated to a far lesser extent and without
functional connectivity [26, 27]. Consistent with these
findings, almost all neurologists in our survey agreed that
MCS patients experience pain. Yet, more than three quar-
ters of participants assume that VS patients also experience
pain and nearly half of them assume that VS patients also
feel hunger and thirst. In the survey by Demertzi et al. [28]
a lower number (56% of the medical doctors) assumed that
VS patients feel pain while an equally high number
affirmed pain perception for MCS (96%). Experience with
patients’ motor or vegetative reactions to noxious stimuli
might have influenced the neurologists’ assumptions. Such
reactions are not necessarily a sign of conscious awareness,
which is a prerequisite for the experience of pain. In a survey
among LiS patients who were in a chronic condition (at least
1 year after a brainstem vascular accident), half of the par-
ticipants experienced pain and two-thirds anxiety [29]. More
studies in this area are clearly warranted. It would be inter-
esting to compare neurologists’ beliefs about the capabilities
of LiS patients with the patients’ self-assessments.
Over 90% of the participants would consider limiting
LST for the VS and LiS patient at least under certain cir-
cumstances, but only 84% would consider it for MCS
patients. Contrary to our expectations, there were no sta-
tistically significant differences in the attitudes toward
limitation of LST among all three cases. The difference
between MCS and VS is in agreement with the recent
European survey done by Demertzi et al. [17], yet they
found far lower rates of physicians’ (i.e., medical profes-
sionals) agreement with treatment limitation (67% for VS
and 27% for MCS). The difference between the attitudes
toward VS and MCS when selecting the attitudes of the
participants from central Europe was still much larger than
in our survey. While their survey asked about patients more
than 1 year after injury, our vignettes referred to patients
with non-traumatic injuries that occurred only 4 months
prior. The use of case vignettes instead of diagnostic terms
and the sample of clinical neurologists instead of attendees
of scientific conferences might explain the different results
of the two studies. Comparing our results to other surveys,
we have to differentiate between attitudes toward treatment
limitation in general or toward withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration in particular. Our results on VS are
quite similar to the results of American, British, and Bel-
gian surveys from the 1990s when comparing the will-
ingness to limit treatment in general (88–91% agreement to
limit LST), but our participants were less willing to with-
draw artificial nutrition and hydration [13–15]. Only 34%
of our participants, who accurately diagnosed the VS case,
would withdraw artificial nutrition and only 23% would
withdraw artificial hydration in the VS case. In the
American, British, and Belgian surveys, 56–89% consid-
ered the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration
appropriate. Even in an Italian survey from 2011 a higher
percentage of the physicians (66%) believed that the
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration to be
appropriate depending on the patient’s wish [30]. On the
other hand, surveys from Japan, and an older German
survey of 283 medical directors of neurological, neuro-
surgical, and rehabilitation departments reported much
lower rates of agreement with limitation of treatment (30,
58%) and withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration
(3, 16%) [16, 20, 31]. Lanzerath et al. gave two reasons for
this: (1) in Germany, artificial nutrition and hydration were
considered to be a form of indispensable basic care and not
a medical treatment measure that could be withdrawn; (2)
the experience with the misuse of medicine during National
Socialism has led to a higher sensibility for ethical con-
cerns, especially regarding end-of-life decisions. There
might also be additional reasons. If the law in a country
explicitly allows limiting artificial nutrition and hydration
in VS patients, like in Great Britain after the case of Tony
Bland, this might influence the physicians’ attitudes.
Moreover, religiosity is a factor that influences treatment
decisions [17], which was confirmed by our results.
Another explanation could be found at the level of meth-
ods: most questionnaires provided only two options (yes or
no), while we offered three answer alternatives and most
participants chose the option ‘‘under certain circum-
stances.’’ Although the sample of the German survey from
1997 is not directly equivalent to our sample, it can be
hypothesized that the attitudes of neurologists have become
more liberal since then, paralleling a process of liberal-
ization in German medical law and ethics [32, 33].
The similar results on the attitudes toward LST in the
VS and LiS group warrant the conclusion that the presence
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or absence of consciousness does not seem to be the basis
for neurologists’ decisions to limit LST, which is consistent
with the arguments of Levy and Savulescu and Wilkinson
et al. [34, 35]. It is surprising that so many neurologists
agree with limiting LST for patients in the LiS. Lule´ et al.
[36] reported that despite their extreme motor impairment,
a significant number of LiS patients maintain a good
quality of life that seems unrelated to their state of physical
functioning. In the study by Bruno et al. [29] 58% of the
LiS patients declared they did not wish to be resuscitated in
case of cardiac arrest, and 53% had envisaged euthanasia,
but only 7% had a current wish for euthanasia. The authors
identified satisfied and dissatisfied subpopulations that also
differed in symptoms of depression, anxiety, and in the
time they had spent in the LiS. A delay of end-of-life
decisions was suggested to allow patients with more recent
injuries to adapt psychologically to the new situation. In
our survey, the median estimated quality of life of the LiS
patient was as high as the median quality of life of the VS
patient. Prognosis of functional outcome could explain the
decision for or against treatment limitation for the MCS
case. Patients in the MCS are regarded as having a better
prognosis than VS patients [37], but studies that examine
the prognosis of MCS patients prospectively are rare [38],
and clinicians often refer to single cases of remarkable late
recoveries of MCS patients [11]. We showed that female
participants tend to be more uniform in their attitudes
(preferring treatment limitation under certain circum-
stances instead of ‘‘always’’ or ‘‘never’’). In other surveys
male gender was significantly associated with greater
willingness to forego LST [39] and to discuss end-of-life
decisions with competent patients [40]. The authors of the
first study argued that female physicians were following
care ethics rather than rights-based ethics.
There were more differences among the three cases
when it came to the agreement with limiting LST under
given circumstances and the concrete treatment measures.
One of the strongest circumstances that led to agreement
for limiting LST was that the patient’s will opposed
treatment. This is in accordance with the ethical principle
of respect of patient autonomy [41]. Interestingly, patient
autonomy was more often extremely strongly agreed upon
in the VS case than in the MCS or LiS case, suggesting that
indirectly diagnosis plays a role in the actualization of the
patient’s will. In German law, a patient’s advance directive
has to be respected. The refusal of treatment by the
patient’s surrogate decision maker is also binding [33]. The
surrogate, however, has the obligation to decide according
to the patient’s will, yet in practice the patient’s will might
be overruled by other arguments such as the surrogate’s
expectation of the patient’s recovery [42]. In our study,
there was strong agreement with the limitation of treatment
if the surrogate refuses consent, particularly in the VS case.
No improvement for more than 1 year was a stronger
argument in the care of a VS patient, a mediocre argument
in the care of a MCS patient, and a weaker argument in the
care of a LiS patient. Opinions on the VS were consistent
with conclusions of expert groups who consider VS as
permanent 3 or 6 months after non-traumatic brain injury
or a year after traumatic brain injury [43, 44]. Yet, the
recommendations were criticized for including patients in
their survival data who died primarily because their life-
sustaining therapy was discontinued [38]. When the rec-
ommendations about the VS were made, the MCS had not
been recognized as a diagnostic category, yet and no time
frames are known to declare the MCS to be irreversible.
Women were not in general less against treatment with-
drawal than men. They agreed less than men with limiting
treatment for patients who suffered from an additional fatal
disease or who had no chance for recovery of communi-
cation, but they agreed more with limiting treatment if
resources were scarce and costs high.
Age and resource scarcity were considered to influence
LST decisions only slightly. We know from specific sur-
veys and qualitative studies that these factors do indeed
influence treatment decision making [45, 46]. Such factors
may act implicitly (as a cause) but may not be explicitly
acknowledged (as a reason). There is a tendency to answer
these questions according to social desirability, and both
ageism and rationing due to resource scarcity are still
taboos in Germany.
Most participants considered forgoing cardiopulmonary
resuscitation and mechanical ventilation. They were,
however, reluctant to limit artificial nutrition or hydration.
This pattern is well known from many studies on attitudes
and actual practices of end-of-life decision-making [47,
48], including a recent survey of German intensive care
clinicians [49]. We identified gender differences in the
willingness to withhold antibiotic treatment, artificial
nutrition and hydration. More women were reluctant to
limit these treatment forms than men. To our knowledge,
gender difference particularly in regard to the willingness
to withdraw artificial and hydration in disorders of con-
sciousness patients have not been described before. Deci-
sions about artificial nutrition and hydration in DOC
patients are still controversial issues for healthcare pro-
viders both in Europe and North America [10, 12]. Most
countries’ laws, including German law, do not differentiate
between withdrawing or withholding artificial nutrition and
hydration or any other form of LST.
That the majority of the neurologists would prefer the
same treatment measures for themselves can be interpreted
in two ways. It could be claimed that their decisions are
value-driven or that they want the best treatment for their
patients as they would want for themselves. Interestingly
almost no one would prefer more treatment for themselves
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than for the patient, but 30% preferred more treatment for
the patient than for themselves. Maybe they want to be
more cautious about their patients than about themselves or
perhaps to avoid feelings of guilt.
We found that determining the prognosis of potential
recovery as well as determining the patient’s wishes
regarding the treatment in conditions such as VS, MCS,
and LiS were the most ethically challenging issues for the
participants of this study. This finding was not surprising
given that the challenge of prognosis is a recurring theme
in the literature on DOC, as well as in the care of severely
ill neurological patients on the whole [10]. Identifying
patients’ treatment wishes is known to be one of the most
difficult challenges for physicians, especially if the
patients are incompetent and uncommunicative [50].
Advance directives may facilitate decisions in accordance
with the patients’ wishes, but as brain injuries are mostly
unexpected and often strike young, healthy people,
advance directives are rarely present for DOC patients.
Even if they are available, their interpretation can be
difficult [51]. Issues that were judged to be less chal-
lenging (e.g., finding long-term care placements, accom-
pany families and treating patients within staff rotations,
discussing treatment decisions in a multidisciplinary
context) revolve around contextual or institutional factors.
Contextual factors have been shown in different studies to
influence physicians’ decisions [52], but physicians may
not be cognizant of them or fully acknowledge them [53].
Our results reflect how physicians themselves understand
ethical challenges, which may not be congruent with their
own practices or with the attitudes of family members or
other healthcare providers [54]. The online survey pro-
vides an efficient and successful method for the mea-
surement of knowledge and attitudes toward decision
making for DOC patients that can be conducted in dif-
ferent countries, with physicians with different subspe-
cialties and with members of other professions (e.g.,
nurses).
Limitations
Our e-mail survey had a moderate response rate, low in
comparison with mailed surveys [55]. The fact that online
surveys have lower response rates than mailed surveys is in
accordance with a previous study with residents and faculty
[56]. Compared to other online surveys with physicians,
our response rate is acceptable (other surveys: 5% [57],
13%, [58], 72% of 68 active members of a professional
society [59]). Our survey was relatively long, which may
have put off potential participants. The society we accessed
has over 6,000 members, and therefore diffusion of
responsibility might also lower the response rate. Another
problem was that we recruited during summer holidays.
Some potential participants informed us that they did not
fill in the questionnaire because they did not care for DOC
patients. In spite of these caveats, the cohort in our study
was still representative for the German Society of Neu-
rology by age and region, and the sample representative by
age, but not by gender. Statistical analysis showed that
gender had no influence on diagnostic accuracy, but it had
an influence on the attitudes toward the limitation of LST.
It is possible that our survey overrepresented the perspec-
tive of male neurologists that seem to be more in favor of
extreme answers (to always or never limit LST), as com-
pared to the female participants considering treatment
limitation under certain circumstances. To fully acknowl-
edge gender differences in the attitudes toward treatment
limitation the issue should be in the focus of following
studies.
Members of other specialties such as anesthesiology,
palliative medicine, rehabilitation medicine, and pediatrics
were not included given our focus on neurology experts
and our goal of measuring the application of diagnostic
knowledge. These specialists could be included in further
studies to understand differences between specialty physi-
cians as well as differences between physicians and other
healthcare providers. Other studies revealed that there are
cultural differences in the attitudes toward treatment limi-
tation; therefore, our results should be compared to those of
other countries [60].
Conclusion
The application of diagnostic knowledge of VS, MCS, and
LiS was accurately performed by most German neurolo-
gists. Their attitudes were mostly in favor of limiting life-
sustaining treatment and slightly differed between MCS as
compared to VS and LiS. Attitudes strongly differed under
certain circumstances (e.g., patient’s will opposed treat-
ment) and according to treatment measures.
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